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THE NATURAL LAW AND OUR COMMON LAW*
JOHN C. H. WUt
I
S OME prominent English and American jurists have spoken of the
Common Law in terms of "Our Lady." In fact, Justice Cardozo and
Sir Frederick Pollock have used the beautiful expression "Our Lady of the
Common Law." I I do not know whether either of them fully realized
the implications of this title. To a Catholic, it is likely to suggest the
image of Our Lady holding tenderly the Divine Infant in her arms. If the
Common Law is Our Lady, then the Natural Law is the Divine Infant
that she holds in her embrace. In appearance, it is Our Lady who holds
the Divine Infant. In reality, it is the Divine Infant who holds Our Lady.
We know that the Divine Infant is none other than the Word, Who "was
in the beginning with God." 2 But it is easier for us to seek Him in the
arms of Our Lady. This gives you an idea of how I am going to approach
the subject which has been, for some mysterious reason, assigned to me:
"The Natural Law and Our Common Law."
To speak plainly, my method will be empirical and historical. At least,
I shall start from the full-blooded experience of the Common Law. We
may mount higher and higher until we attain a transcendental vision of
the Natural Law or even of the Eternal Law. But our starting point must
be a juridical experience. 3
* Address at Symposium held by the Guild of Catholic Lawyers of Nev York City,
December 5, 1953, revised and amplified by the author for publication in the Fordham Law
Review. In preparing this address the author wishes to acknowledge the assistance given him
by Monsignor John L. McNulty and Father Thomas Reardon.
'I Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.
1. Justice Cardozo used "Our Lady of the Common Law" as the title of an address
delivered in 1928 to the first graduating class of the Law School of St. John's University. See
Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo 87 et seq. (Hall's ed. 1947). As to Pollock's
use of the same expression, see Pollock-Holmes Letters XV Introd. (English ed. 1941).
2. St. John's Gospel, 1:2.
3. Theoretically, man can arrive at the notion of the natural law by following the light
of natural reason, with which he is endowed by God. Plato, Aristotle and Cicero had
expounded the doctrine of natural law with varying degrees of perfection. Confucianism
had attained to a vision of the natural law which comes even nearer to that of the Christians.
This is no place to write about Confucianism. Let one quotation from the Confucian 4 ac
The Golden Mean suffice: "What is ordained by Heaven is called essential nature. Conformity
to the essential nature is called the natural law. The refinement of the natural law is called
culture." This vaguely corresponds to the Thomistic rhythm of eternal, natural and human
law.
In the journals of Matthew Ricci I have come across this interesting statement: "Copies of
the Commandments were printed in Chinese and given out to all who asked for them. Many
who received them said they would live in the future according to these commandments,
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In comparing the Common Law to Our Lady, I am, of course, thinking
of it at its best, not at its worst. Similarly, in comparing the Natural Law
to the Word Incarnate, I am aware that Our Lord enters into humanity
not as an Idea but as a Living Person.
There can be no denying that the Common Law has one advantage over
all other systems of law: it was Christian from the very beginning of its
history. In connection with the laws of Ethelbert, which saw the light
around 600 A.D., Maitland writes, "Germanic law has no written memo-
rials of the days of its heathenry. Every trace, but the very faintest, of
the old religion has been carefully expurgated from all that is written, for
all that is written passes under ecclesiastical hands. Thus we may guess
that a new force is already beginning to transfigure the whole sum and
substance of barbaric law, before that law speaks the first words that we
can hear." 4
Some decades before the laws of Ethelbert, Emperor Justinian had
promulgated his magnificent Corpus Juris Civiles explicitly "In the name
of Our Lord Jesus Christ." Roman Law had reached its perfection, when
English law was just beginning to prattle like a baby. No one could have
foreseen that the latter was destined, in the centuries to come, to grow
into a more glorious system of law than its predecessor. Justice Holmes
was not boasting when he said that "Our law has reached broader and
more profound generalizations than the Roman law, and at the same time
far surpasses it in the detail with which it has been worked out." I
No doubt, there are many causes for this superiority; but, in my humble
opinion, the most important is that while the Roman Law was a death-
bed convert to Christianity, the Common Law was a cradle Christian. In
preparing this paper, I have gone to the very origins, and have been
thrilled to find that many sages of the Common Law are also Saints of the
Church. King Ethelbert is a Saint, and it is well known that up to the
because as they claimed, they were in such accord with the voice of conscience and with the
natural law. Their reverence for the Christian law increased with their admiration for It."
See China in the Sixteenth Century: The Journals of Matthew Ricci: 1583-1610, 155 Transl.
from the Latin by Louis J. Gallagher, S.J. (Random House, 1953).
Christianity is, of course, more than a mere authoritative publication of the natural law;
but it comprehends it and confirms it by revelation. As O.W. Holmes, Jr. wrote In a note to
Kent's Commentaries on American Law ". . . it is from the sanction which revelation gives
to natural law, that we must expect the gradual increase of the respect paid to justice between
nations. Christianity reveals to us a general system of morality, but the application to the
details of practice is left to be discovered by human reason." 4 n.a (12th ed.) The Common
Law received its natural-law ingredients mostly from Christianity. Therefore, it would be
entirely unhistorical to treat the present subject apart from the influence of Christianity.
4. Maitland, A sketch of English Legal History 5 (Putnam, 1915).
5. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 156 (1920).
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days of Henry VIII, a light was always kept lighted before his tomb.0 It
was St. Theodore who planted the Christian law of marriage on the soil
of England. Edward the Confessor was noted not only for his laws but
for his just administration, which caused him to reign in the hearts of the
people. His selfless devotion to the welfare of the people made them love
his law and government. He has been described as "a man by choice de-
voted to God, living the life of an angel in the administration of his king-
dom, and therefore directed by Him." 7 "The laws and customs of good
King Edward" became a household word for all the succeeding genera-
tions. His life illustrates the truth that "love therefore is the fulfilment of
the law." 8 My impression is that the Common Law was not only founded
on justice, but, what is more important, rooted in grace. It gradually
assimilated the principles of natural law, not as an abstract theory, but
as vital practical rules of human conduct. The leaven worked slowly, but
steadily.
After the Norman Conquest, holy and learned clergymen like Lanfranc,
St. Thomas k Becket, John of Salisbury, and many others continued to
infuse natural-law principles into the Common Law. It may be said that
Canon Law was the nurse and tutor of the Common Law. The very name
"Common Law" was derived from the "us commune" of the canonists.f
It was not until the twelfth century that the name began to be used by the
lawyers, to denote not so much the general custom of the realm as the
custom and judicial tradition of the king's court.1" Thus, the predomi-
nantly judicial origin of the Common Law was clear from its beginning.
As you know, "legal memory" of the Common Law goes back only as
far as the coronation of Richard I, September 3, 1189. Let us take a look
at that age. Pollock and Maitland tell us:
"English law was administered by the ablest, the best educated, men in the realm;
nor only that, it was administered by the selfsame men who were 'the judges ordinary'
of the church's courts, men who were bound to be, at least in some measure, learned
in the canon law. At one moment Henry had three bishops for his archjusticiars. The
climax is reached in Richard's reign. We can then see the king's court as it sits day by
day. Often enough it was composed of the archbishop of Canterbury, two other
bishops, two or three archdeacons, two or three ordained clerks who were going to be
bishops and but two or three laymen. The majority of its members might at any time
be called upon to hear ecclesiastical causes and learn the lessons in law that vwere
addressed to them in papal rescripts." 31
To Pollock and Maitland, "Blackstone's picture of a nation divided
6. Butler, The Lives of the Saints, Ed. by Herbert Thurston, SJ., (February 25, 1932).
7. Id. October 13.
8. St. Paul, Epistle to the Romans 13:8-10.
9. 1 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Lawe 176 (2d ed. 1923).
10. Id. at 184.
11. Id. at 132.
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into two parties, 'the bishops and clergy' on the one side contending foi
their foreign jurisprudence, 'the nobility and the laity' on the other side
adhering 'with equal pertinacity to the old common law' is not true." On
the contrary, "It is by 'popish clergymen' that our English common law
is converted from a rude mass of customs into an articulate system, and
when the 'popish clergymen,' yielding at length to the pope's commands,
no longer sit as the principal justices of the king's court, the creative age
of our medieval law is over." 12
We need not enter into the history of the Magna Carta. I shall content
myself with reproducing two of its provisions which are of especial impor-
tance for our present theme. From Chapter I: "First, we have granted to
God, and by this our present charter have confirmed for us and our heirs
for ever, that the English Church shall be free and shall have her rights
and liberties, whole and inviolable." The other provision is from Chapter
29: "No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised of his free
tenement, liberties or free customs, or outlawed or exiled or in any wise
destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon him, unless by the
lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. To none will we
sell, deny, or delay right or justice."
But I cannot dismiss the Magna Carta without a mention of Cardinal
Stephen Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury, who was actually the soul
of the whole movement. 3 To me it is not without significance that the
father of the Magna Carta was also the author of the magnificent hymn
to the Holy Ghost, Veni Sancte Spiritus.4 The same Spirit that inspired
that hymn motivated and energized, on a lower plane, the movement
which was crowned by the Magna Carta; and I think that the same Spirit
has enlivened the Common Law by breathing into it the liberalizing in-
fluence of natural justice and equity.
If the clergymen had merely converted a rude mass of customs into an
articulate system, it would, indeed, have been an admirable intellectual
achievement, but the system would not have acquired the vitality at
which all students of the Common Law have marvelled. My own surmise
is that the vitality of the Common Law is due to the leaven of the Spirit.
The clergymen did more than produce a vessel of barren clay; they
started a living tradition.
The reign of Henry III (1216-72) is, to my mind, the most important
period of the history of the Common Law. As Pollock and Maitland have
12. Id. at 133.
13. Powicke, Stephen Langton 102 (Oxford, 1928). There is also an article on Stephen
Langton by W. H. Kent in The Catholic Encyclopedia.
14. Id. at 47-48. After looking into the evidences and weighing them carefully, Powicke
says that "there appears to be no doubt that he, and not King Robert of France or Pope
Innocent III, was the author of one of the greatest hymns, the Veni Sancte Spiritus."
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observed, "At the end of that period most of the main outlines of our
medieval law have been drawn for good and all; the subsequent centuries
will be able to do little more than to fill in the details of a scheme which is
set before them as unalterable." 11 It was the age in which the "Father
of the Common Law," Bracton, flourished. Like all men of supreme
achievement, he was born at the right time. The law had grown for many
centuries past, and was ready to send up its bulbs. There was an abun-
dance of material waiting for a man of genius to galvanize it into a living
system. His treatise De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae "is the crown
and flower of English medieval jurisprudence." 11 He drew from many
sources, but his native wit organized them into a harmonious whole. He
learned his Roman Civil Law from Azo of Bologna; 1 7 he absorbed his
Canon Law principles from Gratian's Decretum and the Decretals of
Gregory IX. The Roman law gave him the method of treating his native
materials and filling their gaps. He wove a doctrine out of the plea rolls,
and dealt with the judgments of Pateshull and Raleigh just as Azo had
dealt with the opinions of the Roman jurisconsults and the later glosses.
Like a true Englishman, he introduced the use of cases in presenting the
law. In his Note Book, he had collected no less than two thousand cases;
and in his Treatise he made use of five hundred. Of course, he did not
arrive at the doctrine of stare decisis; but there is no denying the fact that
he was the first to hit upon the idea of developing the law by the method
of analogy. Similar facts should lead to similar decisions. "Si tamen
similia evenerint, per simile judicentur, cure bona sit occasio a simililfts
procedere ad simiia." 18 He veritably discovered a new method of study-
ing juridical realities and solving actual problems of law, a method which
has its roots in the sure-footed Anglo-Saxon habit of dealing with things
as they arise instead of resorting to abstract conceptions. This concrete
way of looking at the law springs from the Anglo-Saxon frame of mind and
finds in it a fertile soil. This is why his seminal thought has grown into a
magnificent tree in course of time; and this is why he may properly be
called the father of the Common Law.
A word must be said also of the system of writs, which Bracton helped
to develop, though he did not invent them. This emphasis on procedure
and remedies is, again, typical of the practical sense of the Anglo-Saxons.
In this respect, they are really more akin to the Romans than to the
modern Romanists.' 9 They are too Roman to receive wholesale the
15. I Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 9, at 174.
16. Id. at 206.
17. Maitland, Bracton and Azo (Selden Society, 1894) pas-im.
18. Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 16 (Woodbines ed. 1915). See 2
Holdsworth, A History of English Law 243 (1922-25).
19. Ehrlich has brought out some of the analogies between English law and Roman law.
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Corpus Juris of an ancient age. As Maitland and Pollock have put it,
"more Roman than the .Romanists," they "made the grand experiment
of a new formulary system. . . . Those few men who were gathered at
Westminster round Pateshull and Raleigh and Bracton were penning writs
that would run in the kingless commonwealths on the other shore of the
Atlantic Ocean; they were making right and wrong for us and for our
children." 20
In yet another sense is Bracton the father of the Common Law. As we
have already seen, the Common Law is a cradle Christian; but it was not
until the thirteenth century that the Christian element of the Common
Law came to some sort of maturity. Bracton, with his extraordinary power
of assimilation, succeeded in formulating a truly Christian philosophy
of law.
His greatness lies not so much in originality as in the fact that he sums
up all that was best in the legal and political philosophy of his time. In
expounding the coronation oath, he says that the King must pledge him-
self to three things-first, that he will do what lies in his power to secure
for the Church of God and all Christian people true peace in his time;
second, that he will forbid all rapine and wrong-doing among all classes of
people; third, in all his judgments he will promote equity and mercy as he
hopes for mercy from a clement and merciful God.21 In fact, according to
Bracton, the king is instituted and elected for the very purpose of doing
justice to all. The king is God's vicar and minister on earth, and it is his
duty to distinguish right from wrong, the equitable from the inequitable,
that his subjects may live honestly, that no man should injure another,
and that each may receive his due and make his reasonable contribution
in return.22 If the king does justice, he is a minister of God; if he does
injustice, he becomes an agent of the devil. He is above his people, but he
"As in Rome, so in England, the material law was chiefly the law of several actions (actiones)."
See Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law 275 (Moll's Transl. Harvard, 1936).
These actions are the channels in which the principles of justice and natural law are made to
flow. While the channels are constructed by what Coke calls "artificial reason and Judgment
of the law," the principles are derived from "the natural reason." The former are mutable,
while the latter are immutable.
20. 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law 674 (2d ed. 1923). It should be
noted that the "new formulary system"--the system of writs-differs from the old In that
while the formula in the Roman law concludes the proceeding before the court, the writ
opens it. But the procedural emphasis is the same.
21. See 3 Carlyle and Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West 34
(3d ed. London, 1915).
22. Bracton, op. cit. supra note 18, at 107. It is noteworthy that Bracton supplements
the threefold precept of law, which he takes from Justinian, by adding "recta contributione
reddatur." Thus, justice does not consist in merely receiving one's due, but also in making
one's proper contribution.
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is under God and under the Law, for it is the Law that makes him King.
On this point, I would like to introduce a passage, which I have translated
with the help of Father Edward Synan:
"The king himself, however, ought not to be under man but under God, and under
the Law because the Law makes the king. Therefore, let the king render back to the
Law what the Law gives to him, namely, dominion and power; for therc is no ing
where will, and not Law, wield dominion. That as a vicar of God he ought to be under
the Law is dearly shown by the example of Jesus Christ whose place he takes on
earth. For although there lay open to God, for the salvation of the human race, many
ways and means beyond our telling, His true mercy chose this way especially for
destroying the work of the devil: He used, not the force of His power, but the counsel
of His justice. Thus He was willing to be under the Law 'that He might redeem those
who were under the Law.' For He was unwilling to use power, but judgment. Thus
also the blessed parent of God, the Virgin Mary, mother of the Lord, who by a
unique privilege was above the Law, for the sake of giving an example of humility did
not recoil from following lawful ordinances. The king should act likewise, lest his
power remain unbridled." 23
"There is no king where will, and not the Law, wields dominion." Here
the idea of the supremacy of Law is formulated in the clearest terms. The
essence of Law is not will and force, but judgment and counsel of justice.
In another passage he declares: Inris enim prudentia agnoscit, et justitia
tribuit cuique suum est. Item justitia virtus est, iuris prudentia scientia
est." 24 This may be rendered as: "The prudence of law perceives, and
justice renders to each what is his due. For justice is a virtue, and pru-
dence of law is a science." This is the true sense of jurisprudence; and
yet some modern positivists wish to exclude justice from jurisprudence.
This would be juris-imprudence rather than jurisprudence.
Justice Edward S. Dore, in his admirable address on "Human Rights
and the Law," has said some words which bear out perfectly the point that
Bracton was driving at:
"In one of Juvenal's satires we see a wilful wife commanding her Roman husband
to crucify a slave for no reason. When he asks why he should do so, she answers in a
sentence that has become the classical expression of law as will: 'Hoc volo; sic jubco;
sit pro ratione voluntas. What a depth of revealing meaning is packed into that little
clause sit pro ratione voluntas! Those four words perfectly express any idea of law not
based on reason but on will or force." 25
In the Year Books of Edward III there is a very interesting dialogue
bearing on the nature of law. The counsel in his argument was saying
that the judges should do as others had done in similar cases, "otherwise
we should not know what the law is." Justice Hillary interrupted him by
23. Bracton, op. it. supra note 18, at S b.
24. Id. at 36.
25. 15 Ford. L. Rev. 11 (1946). The importance of this article has been pointed out by
Messner in his'Social Ethics: Natural Law in the Modern World 240 (Doherty's transl. 1949).
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saying, "The will of the judges." Chief Justice Stonore responded, "No,
law is reason." 20
Of course, both will and reason enter into the making of a law. Will is
not to be despised, because it is given by God to man and belongs to his
spiritual nature. As St. Thomas has said, "All law proceeds from the
reason and will of the lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the
reasonable will of God; the human law from the will of man, regulated by
reason."27 In other words, "in order that the volition of what is com-
manded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some
rule of reason." 28
It is to the credit of Bracton that, although he apparently did not have
the chance of reading St. Thomas' Treatise on Law, his ideas came very
close to his. His definition of law is embodied in a passage which is as
follows:
"Now let us see what is law; and we should know that law is the com-
mon precept of prudent men in council, the coercive prohibition of offenses
which are committed intentionally or by ignorance, the impartial bulwark
of the common interests. Also God is the author of justice, because justice
is in the Creator. And accordingly, rightness and law (ius et lex) signify
the same thing, and while in the widest sense everything that can be read
is called law, strictly it signifies just sanction, enjoining what is fair and
decent and forbidding the contrary." 20 As Dr. Miriam T. Rooney has
justly remarked, Bracton's definition of law and principles of sanction "are
a masterly synthesis of what had gone on before his time in the develop-
ment of the common law and in the growth of Christian thought." 80
His influence on later jurists such as Coke, Holt and Blackstone, and
on some of our contemporaries has been salutary and profound.
Bracton's contributions to "case law" and to the idea of supremacy of
law are contributions not only to the Common Law but also to the philos-
ophy of the Natural Law. In his book, The Spirit of the Common Law,
Roscoe Pound has pointed out that the two most salient characteristics of
the Common Law are the doctrine of precedents and the doctrine of the
supremacy of law. He has further pointed out that there is a common
element in these two doctrines, that is, reason.
"The same spirit is behind each. The doctrine of precedents means that causes are
to be judged by principles reached inductively from the judicial experience of the past,
not by deduction from rules established arbitrarily by the sovereign will. In other
26. Y.B. 18-19 Edw. III, pl. 378.
27. Summa Theologica Ia, IIae, Q. 97, a. 3, in corp.
28. Id. at Q. 90, a. 1, ad 3.
29. Bracton, op. cit. supra note 18, at 2. The translation is mine.
30. Rooney, Lawlessness, Law, and Sanction 76 (Catholic University of America, 1937).
This book contains an excellent expos6 of Bracton's philosophy of law, on pp. 58-76.
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words, reason, not arbitrary will, is to be the ultimate ground of decision. The doctrine
of the supremacy of law is reducible to the same idea. It is a doctrine that the sover-
eign and all its agencies are bound to act upon principles, not according to arbitrary
will; are obliged to follow reason instead of being free to follow caprice. Both represent
the Germanic idea of law as a quest for the justice and truth of the Creator. The
common-law doctrine is one of reason applied to experience." 3'
In this Dean Pound has shown a very keen insight into the spirit of the
Common Law. My only reservation is that he, did not seem at the time of
his writing to have an adequate knowledge of the Scholasticism of the
thirteenth century to trace this spirit to the true source.
In fact, both the idea of supremacy of law and the practical, concrete
way of dealing with cases, which are so characteristic of the Common
Law, came from the wisdom of the Catholic Church. The modern specu-
lative, rationalistic philosophies of Natural Law are aberrations from the
highroad of the scholastic tradition. In this connection, I cannot resist the
urge to quote some very sensible words from one of the contemporary
authorities on Canon Law, Professor Stephan Kuttner:
"The science of Natural Law, like all knowledge in the realm of practical reason,
deals with human acts and cannot be construed, more gcometrico, in an abstract,
speculative fashion, i.e., without the empirical data of actual human relations and
social compounds. The concept of Natural Law, it is true, taken in its strict sense as
the principles which are immediately given by the rational and social nature of man,
has its own reality, 'exists' in the intellectual order in the manner of Universals; yet
in the practical order it can exercise a normative function as rcgula ct iensura only by
some relation to the contingencies of man's social edstence here and now: and these
contingencies are many and changeable. They are the subject matter of positive law in
all its variety and relativity, and it bespeaks the wisdom of medieval schoolmen that
they are satisfied with philosophizing about the essential relations of all positive law to
the natural, rather than dreaming of a Natural Law which would rule human social
behavior once for all as a perfect code in minute detail, and thus make all positive law
superfluous by absorption; or rather than removing Natural Law to the ever unattain-
able rarefied sphere of a transcendental ideal." 32
31. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 182-183 (Marshall Jones, 1921). This book
should be read together with his later lectures on "The Church in Legal History," delivered
at the Catholic University of America in 1939, and published in Jubilee Law Lectures in the
same year.
32. The Natural Law and Canon Law, in 3 Natural Law Institute Proceedings 1949
85 (Notre Dame, 1950). I do not quite see eye-to-eye with Prof. Kuttner where he says that
the concept of the Natural Law "exists" merely "in the intellectual order in the manner of
Universals." Being derived from the eternal law, which is in the Mind of God, I should
think that the natural law is rooted in the Reason and the Will of God and therefore possesses
a higher degree of reality than the words of Kuttner would seem to indicate. But I am on
all fours with his criticism of the speculative philosophers of Natural Law, who have pro-
ceeded more geometrico. A typical instance is Samuel Pufendorf's Blementa iutrisprudentiac
universalis, where, as Coleman Philipson has aptly pointed out, he "adopts the Euclidean
method, and professes to establish certain conclusions by the strict process of mathematical
demonstration." See Great Jurists of the World 310 (Boston, 1914). The great difference
1954]
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This describes the method of St. Thomas. It describes also the method
of Bracton and, therefore, the Common Law tradition.88 It is most regret-
table that practically all of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth
century philosophers of Natural Law departed from this great tradition.
They proceeded more geometrico; they wove whole systems of so-called
Natural Law just as a spider would weave a net out of its own belly. To
mention a few, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Pufendorf, Christian Wolff,
Thomasius, Burlamaqui, Kant, Hegel, and even Bentham with his felicific
calculus, 4 all belong to the speculative group. Many of the nineteenth
century judges in America abused the name of Natural Law by identifying
it with their individualistic bias. One of them even erected his irrational
racial prejudice to the dignity of Natural Law."5
Shortly after the death of Bracton appeared the Year Books. The earli-
est of them came out in 1292. They were produced by the lawyers who
had been organized in the Inns of Court and Chancery. These Inns were
virtually centers of legal study, which carried on and further strengthened
the tradition of the Common Law as a system of case law. Although the
fourteenth century is not adorned by outstanding legal luminaries, its
anonymous contribution to the continuity of the legal system is not to be
slighted. In the fifteenth century came Littleton and Fortescue. I shall
not enter into Littleton's classic work on Tenures, except to say that it
marks a milestone in the law of real property. John Fortescue, as a
declared disciple of St. Thomas Aquinas, was opposed to the Roman pre-
cept: Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem (whatever pleases the
sovereign has the force of law)." He maintains that "a king of England
between these speculative philosophers and the medieval Schoolmen is that, while the former
are rationalistic and dogmatic, the latter are rational and experimental.
33. I suspect that the early lawyers, steeped as they were in the Holy Scriptures, especially
in the Gospel, had assimilated, more or less unconsciously, the concrete way of arguing which
was employed by Christ Himself in answering the question of the Pharisees and scribes, A
whole volume can be written on Christ's art of reasoning and judging.
34. See Mitchell, Bentham's Felicific Calculus,- 33 Political Science Quarterly 161-183
(1918). Pollock was not far from the truth when he declared that Bentham's works were
Naturrecht pure and simple. Pollock, History of the Science of Politics 111-112 (London,
1925). St. Thomas's philosophy of natural law comprehends the principle of utility, but looks
beyond it.
35. State v. Bell, 7 Baxt. 9 (Tenn. 1872). There the judge denounced the marriage of a
white man with a colored woman as against the natural law, putting it on a par with "the
father living with his daughter, the son with the mother, the brother with the sister," or
even the "Turk or Mohammedan" living "with his numerous wives." "Yet none of these,"
he continued to assert, "are more revolting, more to be avoided, or more unnatural than the
case before us. Chancellor Kent says the contract of marriage is a stable and sound contract,
of natural as well as municipal law. This is neither." This kind of perverted version of the
natural law has done not a little in bringing it into disrepute.
36. See Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae, c. 9 (Chrime's transl. 1942).
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cannot, at his pleasure, make any changes in the laws of the land, for he
rules by a government which is not only regal, but political." a He can
only make such changes with the consent of the people. For him, the
natural law, as revealed in the Old Testament and in the Gospel, is su-
preme. "For no edict or action of a king, even if it has arisen politickly,
hath ever escaped the vengeance of divine punishment, if it hath pro-
ceeded from him against the rule of Nature's Law." "I
In fact, the legal philosophy of the fifteenth century is still deeply
Christian. In 1468, for instance, the Chancellor told the House of Lords
that "justice was ground, well and root of all prosperity, peace and public
rule of every realm, whereupon all the laws of the world had been ground
and set, which resteth in three; that is to say, the law of God, the law of
Nature, and positive law." 11 In a Year Book of the reign of Henry VI is
found the significant remark that "the law is the highest inheritance which
the King has; for by the law he and all his subjects are ruled, and if there
was no law, there would be no King and no inheritance." 40 This again
reminds us of Bracton.
At the opening of the sixteenth century, there arose a very interesting
case, The Prior of Castleacre v. The Dean of St. Stephens.4 ' A priory had
been dissolved and its property vested in the Crown by an Act of Parlia-
ment. The question in that case was, did the Crown thereby become
"parson" of the church? If he did, he would be entitled to tithes. The
Court of Common Pleas was unanimous in holding that the King did not
become parson. In the words of Chief Justice Frowicke, "I have not seen
that any temporal man can be parson without the agreement of the su-
preme head." The supreme head was of course the Pope. Justice Kings-
mill likewise said, "The act of Parliament cannot make the king to be
parson, for we through our law cannot make any temporal man to have
spiritual jurisdiction; for nothing can do that except the supreme head."
So Justice Fisher: "And the king cannot be parson by this act of Parlia-
ment, nor can any temporal man through this act be called parson." Not
a single dissenting voice appears on record. Who could have expected
then that in twenty-eight years' time an Act of Parliament was to transfer
the title of "Supreme Head" to Henry VIII? That Act was not only con-
trary to the law of God and the law of Nature, but to the Common Law
itself.
It was under that Act that Thomas More, the most illustrious sage and
37. Ibid.
38. Fortescue, De Natura Legis Naturae, Pt. I, c. 27 (Gregor's transl. 1874).
39. See O'Sullivan, Under God and the Law XVI (Newman Press, 1949).
40. Y B. 19 Hen. VI, pl. 1. (1504).
41. Y.B. 21 Hen. VII, pL 1 (1506).
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saint of the Common Law, was indicted for and convicted of treason. A
servile Parliament and a servile Court conspired with a lawless tyrant to
murder a just man. The glorious martyrdom of St. Thomas More is too
well-known to call for a detailed treatment. All that I want to say is that
the Common Law itself suffered in his death a fatal wound, from which it
has not recovered even now, at least, in England. It does not take a
Catholic lawyer to see this. Maitland, who was neither a Catholic nor an
Anglican, has this to say:
"... in 1535, the year in which More was done to death, the Year Books come to
an end; in other words the great stream of Law Reports that has been flowing for near
two centuries and a half, ever since the days of Edward I, become discontinuous and
then runs dry. The exact significance of this ominous event has never yet been fully
explored, but ominous it surely is. Some words that fell from Edmund Burke occur to
us: 'to put an end to the Reports is to put an end to the law of England.'" 42
In the Prologue to his excellent biography of Thomas More, R. W.
Chambers, another non-Catholic, has written: "This book attempts to
depict More not only as a martyr (which he was) but also as a great
European statesman; More's far-sighted outlook was neglected amid the
selfish despotisms of his age; yet his words, his acts, and his sufferings
were consistently, throughout life, based upon principles which have sur-
vived him. More was killed, but these principles must, in the end, triumph.
If they do not, the civilization of Europe is doomed." "' What are these
principles? Chambers quotes the words of one of the greatest Catholic
lawyers of contemporary England, Richard O'Sullivan, K. C.: "The life
and death of Thomas More are witness to the principle of limitation of
the power of the King or of Parliament, and the writings and the judg-
ments of a constellation of Catholic and non-Catholic historians and
lawyers in our own time have led to a reaffirmation of the principles of
Natural and Divine Law for which he lived and died." "
About Henry VIII, Maitland has written: "If Henry were minded to
be 'the Pope, the whole Pope, and something more than the Pope/ he
might trust the civilians to place the triple and every other crown upon his
head. . . . The Civilian would, if he were true to his Code and his Novels,
find his ideas realized when and only when the Church had become a
department of State." 11 In other words, they might have identified law
with the will of the sovereign. Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem.
But the fact is that scholastic philosophy of law was too deeply rooted
42. Maitland, English Law and Renaissance, see I Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal
History 192-193 (Boston, 1907).
43. Chambers, Thomas More 15 (London, 1936).
44. Id. at 383.
45. Maitland, Canon Law in the Church of England 90.
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in the English soil to be entirely uprooted. Shakespeare, for instance,
seems to know his Common Law and Natural Law pretty well. He knows
the psychological reason of case law. He makes Portia say:
"There is no power in Venice
Can alter a decree established:
Twill be recorded for a precedent;
And many an error by the same example
Will rush into the state." 40
He knows the importance of tempering the rigors of law with equity:
"And earthy power doth then show likest God's
When mercy seasons justice." 47
He knows the importance of observing degree, proportion, form and
order, which to him are objective standards of right and wrong, because
they have an ontological basis:
"Take but degree away, untune that string,
And, hark, what discord follows; each thing meets
In mere opugnancy: the bounded waters
Should lift their bosoms higher than the shores,
And make a sop of all this solid globe:
Strength should be lord of imbecility,
And the rude son should strike his father dead:
Force should be right; or rather, right and wrong,
Between whose endless jar justice resides,
Should lose their names, and so should justice too.
Then everything includes itself in power,
Power into will, will into appetite;
And appetite, a universal wolf,
So doubly seconded with will and power,
Must make perforce a universal prey,
And last eat up himself." 48
46. Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene 1.
47. Ibid.
48. Troilus and Cressida, Act I, Scene 3. On the religious faith of Shakespeare, see Mutsch-
mann and Wentersdorf, Shakespeare and Catholicism (Sheed and Ward, 1952). There can
be no question about the soundness of Shakespeare's philosophy of the natural law. Let me
quote one more passage:
It is great sin to swear unto a sin,
But greater sin to keep a sinful oath.
Who can be bound by any solemn vow
To do a murderous deed, to rob a man,
To force a spotless virgin's chastity,
To reave the orphan of his patrimony,
To wring the widow from her custom'd right,
And for no other reason for this wrong,
But that he was bound by a solemn oath. (2 Henry VI, Act V, Scene I)
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This leads us to Sir Edward Coke, of whom Holdsworth has said:
"What Shakespeare has been to literature,. . . Coke has been to the pub-
lic and private law of England." 41 At a time when political speculation
was tending to exalt a sovereign person or body above the law, Coke
had the insight and the courage to resort to the law of God and the
law of nature, thus preserving the medieval idea of the supremacy of
the law. In Calvin's Case,50 he declared that "the law of nature is part
of the law of England," that "the law of nature was before any judicial or
municipal law," and that "the law of nature is immutable." He identified
the law of nature with lex aeterna. He said, "The law of nature is that
which God at the time of creation of the nature of man infused into his
heart, for his preservation and direction; and this is lex aeterna, the moral
law, called also the law of nature. And by this law written with the fingdr
of God in the heart of man, were the people of God a long time governed,
before the law was written by Moses, who was the first reporter or writer
of law in the world." Again, in Dr. Bonham's Case,"' he laid down the
principle of judicial review: "And it appears in our books, that in many
cases, the common law will controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes
adjudged to be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against com-
mon right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the
common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void." This
seminal thought did not sprout in England, but, as we shall see, it was
later transplanted in America and burst into flowers.
But even in England, this doctrine of judicial review of Parliamentary
acts found some later echoes. In the case of Day v. Savadge,5 2 where
Chief Justice Hobart declared that "even an Act of Parliament, made
against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in his own case, is void in
it self; for Jura naturae sunt immutabilia, and they are leges legum." The
influence of Bracton on Hobart and Coke is manifest.
In fact, in his struggle with King James I, Coke cited Bracton as an
49. Holdsworth, Some Makers of English Law 132 (Cambridge, 1938).
50. 7 Co. Rep. 1, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1610).
51. 8 Co. Rep. 113 b, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610). See Plunknett, Bonham's Case and
Judicial Review, 40 Harvard Law Review 30 (1927). The influence of Coke upon American
jurists has been tremendous. Even as late as 1831, in Bank of State v. Cooper, Justice Green
declared, "There are eternal principles of justice which no government has a right to disre-
gard. . . . Some acts, although not expressly forbidden, may be against the plain and obvious
dictates of reason. 'The common law,' says Lord Coke, 'adjudgeth a statute so far void,'"
2 Yerg. 599, at 603 (Tenn.) Thus, judicial review was not only based on the Constitution,
but on what Corwin has called "a Higher Law."
52. Hobart 85 (K.B. 1614).
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authority. He maintained in the presence of the king that by the law of
England the king in person could not judge any cause, and that all cases,
civil and criminal, were to be determined in some court of justice accord-
ing to the law and custom of the realm. Natural reason dictates that the
adjudication of legal controversies should resort to "artificial" reason.
Natural law must be supplemented by human law, for art perfects nature;
and this too is a precept of the natural law.
The momentous encounter between Coke and King James furnishes
much food for thought. We will let Coke tell his own story.
"A controversy of land between parties was heard by the King, and sentence given,
which was repealed for this, that it did not belong to the common law: then the King
said, that he thought the law was founded upon reason, and that he and others had
reason as well as the Judges: to which it was answered by me, that true it was, that
God had endowed His Majesty with excellent science, and great endowinents of nature;
but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which
concern the life, or inheritance, or goods or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be
decided by natural reason but by artificial the reason and judgment of law, which law
is an act which requires long study and experience before that a man can attain to the
cognizance of it; and that the law was the golden met-wand and measure to try the
causes of the subjects: and which protected His Majesty in safety and peace: with
which the King was greatly offended, and said, that then he should be under the law,
which was treason to affirm, as he said; to which I said that Bracton saith, quod Rex
non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege." r3
This is perfectly in line with the Confucian philosophy that human
nature is ordained by God, that accordance with this nature is called the
natural law, and that the cultivation and refinement of the natural law is
called culture. 4 It is also in line with the Thomistic position that while there
is necessity in the general principles of natural law, the remoter conclu-
sions and the particular determinations of the natural law are a matter for
human law, which, as Coke has pointed out, must depend upon e-xperience
and study, and which must vary according to the conditions of mankind
and circumstances of the time. In fact, St. Thomas envisions the eternal
law, the natural law and the human law as a continuous series. He even
holds that the natural law can be changed by way of addition. It grows by
recognizing new values emerging in the process of civilization.55
For Coke too, the law of God, the law of nature or reason, and the law
of the land form a continuous series. For him the common law is a tree
rooted firmly in God and nature, and growing into an evergreen. No
one seems to know the spirit of the common law more intimately than
53. Prohibitions Del Roy, 12 Co. Rep. 63 (K.B. 1612).
54. See note 3 supra. Art is continuous with nature.
55. See, for instance, on the modern recognition of the right of privacy, Patterson, Juris-
prudence: Men and Ideas of the Law 374 (Foundation Press, 1953).
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Coke. It is not for nothing that Maitland calls him "the incarnate com-
mon law." 6
The idea of Coke that the king and even Parliament are under God and
under the law, is a tough idea. Even as late as the eighteenth century, we
find Lord Holt supporting Coke's ideas in the case of City of London v.
Wood;5 7 "And what my Lord Coke says in Dr. Bonham's Case in his 8
Co. is far from any extravagancy, for it is a very reasonable and true
saying, that if an act of Parliament should ordain that the same person
should be party and Judge, or, which is the same thing, Judge in his own
cause, it would be a void Act of Parliament; for it is impossible that one
should be Judge and party, for the Judge is to determine between party
and party, or between the Government and the party. . . " He says
further that, though an act of parliament may do certain things that "look
pretty odd," yet obviously there are limits. For example, it "may not
make adultery lawful."
In R. v. Knollys,5" Holt held that the House of Lords could not extend
its privilege at its will. In Ashby v. White et al.,"' and Paty's Case,"0 he
denied a similar claim by the House of Commons. Yes, there are things
which even Parliament could not do. It is significant that the decision of
Ashby v. White et al., was followed in 1839 in the case of Stockdale v.
Hansard.61
In view of this, it is, indeed, strange to hear a judge of the Court of
Common Pleas declare in 1871: "It was once said,-I think in Hobart,-
that, if an Act of Parliament were to create a man judge in his own case,
the Court might disregard it. That dictum, however, stands as a warning,
rather than an authority to be followed. We sit here as servants of the
Queen and the legislature. Are we to act as regents over what is done by
parliament with the consent of the Queen, lords, and commons? I deny
that any such authority exists." 62 I do not question the particular judg-
ment in that case. It might have been reached on some other grounds.
But when you hear a judge speak in such a servile tone, you have reason
to fear that the Common Law is beginning to lose its soul.
56. Op. cit. supra note 4, at 113, where Maitland writes, "Sir Edward Coke, the Incarnate
common law, shovels out his enormous learning in vast disorderly heaps."
57. 12 Mod. 669, 687, 688 (K.B. 1701).
58. 1 Ld. Raym. 10 (K.B. 1695).
59. 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 3 Ld. Raym. 320 (K.B. 1703). This case was relied upon as an
authority by Justice Holmes in Nixon v. Hearndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) for holding that
private damage caused by political action may be recovered in a suit at law. This is but one
instance to show the tenacity of the common-law tradition.
60. 2 Ld. Raym. 1105 (K.B. 1705).
61. 9 A. & E. 1 (K.B. 1839).
62. Lee et al. v. The Bude and Torrington Junction Ry. Co., 6 L.R. C.P. 576. See also
Hall, Readings in Jurisprudence 289 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1938).
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Now to return to Holt. Steeped in the spirit of the Common Law, Holt
had the greatest respect for the dignity and liberty of the human person.
In several cases, he held no one could be a slave on the English soil. He
said in one case that "By the common law no man can have a property in
another.... 63 In another case he declared that "as soon as a negro
comes to England he is free; and one may be a villein in England, but not
a slave." 64
In many of his decisions one senses a sweet reasonableness so charac-
teristic of the Common Law. For instance, in the case of Blankard v.
Galdy, 5 he distinguished settled colonies from conquered colonies. In
the settled colonies "all laws in force in England are in force there. . ....
On the other hand, in the conquered colonies, "the laws of England do not
take place there, until declared so by the conqueror ... ." If a pagan
country is conquered, "their laws by conquest do not entirely cease, but
only such as are against the law of God; and ... in such cases, where
the laws are rejected or silent, the conquered country shall be governed
according to the rule of natural equity." This consideration for the habits
and customs of a people is one of the greatest qualities that the Common
Law had assimilated from the mellow and moderate wisdom of the Scho-
lastics, whose philosophy of Natural Law leaves a large room for di-
versities.
In the world of practical lawyers, the best-known case that Holt decided
is Coggs v. Bernard.66 In that case, as you will remember, Lord Holt,
relying on the authority of Bracton, distinguished no less than six kinds
of bailments, and tried, with the patience of a scholar and discernment of
an artist, to determine the degree of care which the bailee in each category
should exercise. This case has jurisprudential significance, for here you
see the judicial process at work; you see how the mind of the judge reacts
toward different situations, you see a most delicate and sensitive scale
telling how much care is required in each case and the corresponding
degree of negligence for holding the bailee liable. In some situations the
utmost care is required, and therefore the slightest negligence is sufficient
to constitute a ground for liability. In other cases, fairness requires a
slight degree of care, and therefore only gross negligence on the part of the
bailee would make him liable. In still other situations, where ordinary
care seems to be called for, ordinary negligence is enough. Of course,
there is no finality about this classification. In fact, Justice Story 7 has
63. Smith v. Gould, 2 Ld. Raym. 1274 (K.B. 1706).
64. Smith v. Browne and Cooper, Holt, K.B. 495 (K.B. 1703).
65. 2 Salk. 411 (1694).
66. 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (K.B. 1704).
67. Story, Commentaries on Bailments 5-7 (5th ed. 1851).
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reduced the bailments into three categories, namely, those for the benefit
of the bailor, those for the benefit of the bailee, and those for mutual bene-
fit; and he has rationalized further the degrees of care and negligence
appropriate to each class. But what I am interested in bringing out is that
this is the modality of our Common Law, very much similar to that of the
Roman Law in its formative and creative days, before it was codified. Our
Lady, the Common Law, is a patient and kindly housewife who knows how
to make, stitch by stitch, a seamless tunic for you to wear.
Of course, legal distinctions are seldom matters of black and white. As
you know, gross negligence may amount to intentional wrong, and great
intentional wrong may merge into malice. In the words of Ulpian, Magna
negligentia culpa est, magna culpa dolus est." The possibility of a great
danger is equivalent to the probability of a small one. And then we must
remember that law is not an exact science; and we are not required to
weigh the consequences of our actions "with as much exactness as an
apothecary would drugs on his scales." 09 On the whole, all that we are
required to do is to exercise the reasonable judgment of an ordinary pru-
dent man.
The Common Law is full of fringes and penumbra; full of shades and
nuances; this is what makes it so human, so attractive, and so natural. In
the enchanted garden of Common Law, there are many shady groves
which cheer your heart and refresh your spirit at the same time that they
lure you on to new vistas. It is not a closed garden, but one which is con-
tinuous with the wild fields, hills and rivers on one side, and leads to the
streets and market-places on the other. At first you feel all but lost in the
labyrinthine ways and paths; you want to discover some design but you
find none. But daily saunterings in the garden familiarize you gradually
with the genie of the place, the atmosphere, the ever-changing moods of
the garden, with the inevitable result that you are more and more fasci-
nated by it. You begin to divine a certain vague design, but the element
of surprise is never lacking, because it seems to change with the weather
and assumes a new aspect upon the advent of every new season. Perhaps
you find some traces of human designing here and there, but you are not
able to tell exactly where nature ends and art begins. You do not find a
general design, except perhaps the design of nature or of a mysterious
Providence. What you find is not logical consistency arrived at once for
all, but an endless series of organic adaptations which must be renewed
every day.
68. Dig. 50, 16, 226.
69. See Sikes v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 429, 200 S. W.2d 956 (1947). There Commis-
sioner Stanley quotes these words. He also writes, "Man-made law is not blind to human
nature; at least self-preservation."
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The Common Law is not a closed system but an open system. In its
golden days, the winds blow into it from heaven. In its days of expansion,
the winds blow in from the oceans, as is the case in the age of Mansfield.
Lord Mansfield was perhaps the most dynamic personality that ever
adorned the English bench. I do not regard him as a first-rate legal scholar
or philosopher. But he was a man full of practical common sense and
profound moral intuitions, with sufficient grounding in the humanities to
quote from Cicero. He hardly seems to distinguish the ius gentium from
the ius naturale any more than Gains did.70 But for his practical pur-
poses, ius gentium was good enough to be natural law. Anyway, the
cosmopolitan usages and customs of the international merchants were
nearer to the law of nature than the local laws of a single country. In
Luke et al. v. Lyde,71 which involved a claim for freight, he declared that
"the maritime law is not the law of a particular country, but the general
law of nations. Non erit alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia nunc, alia
posthac; sed et apud omnes gentes et omni tempore una eadcrzque le=
obtinebit." 72 Nowhere was his Scotch common sense and native wit more
clearly shown than in his creation of Mercantile Special Juries. As Lord
Campbell has told us, "Lord Mansfield reared a body of special jurymen
at Guildhall, who were generally returned on all commercial cases to be
tried there. He was on terms of the most familiar intercourse with them,
not only conversing freely with them in Court, but inviting them to dine
with him. From them he learned the usages of trade, and in return he
took great pains in explaining to them the principles of jurisprudence by
which they were to be guided." 73 When the law keeps its eyes open to the
realities of life, it becomes fruitful. By adopting and applying the its
gentium Lord Mansfield added a new mansion to the Common Law, which
is a house of many mansions. While theoretically he seems to have con-
fused the idea of natural law with the international usages of trade, yet
he was acting in the spirit of the natural law, for one of the precepts of
natural law is precisely that human law should adapt itself constantly to
the changing conditions of human civilization. A system of law that does
not advance falls back.74
70. Gaius, Institutes, 1, 1.
71. 2 Burr. 887 (K.B. 1759).
72. The quotation is from Cicero, De Re Publica. See Keyes's translation in Loeb Classcal
Library 211 (Putnam, 1928).
73. 3 Campbell's, Lives of the Lord Chief justices IL 407, note.
74. No doubt, it is a fixed principle that all laws are ordained to the common good.
But the idea of the common good grows in the course of history. See, for instance, vhat
Chief Justice Vanderbilt has written about the "successive goals" of American jurisprudence
from the pioneer days to the present. Law and Government in the Development of the
American Way of Life 19 (Wisconsin, 1951). As St. Thomas has said, "It seems natural to
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His decisions on quasi-contracts have an even closer bearing upon the
law of nature. In Moses v. Macferlan7 5 which was an action of indebitatus
assumpsit to recover six pounds which the defendant got and kept from
the plaintiff "iniquitously," Lord Mansfield laid down a great principle.
"This kind of equitable action," he said, "to recover back money which
ought not in justice to be kept, is very beneficial, and therefore much
encouraged. It lies only for money which, ex aequo et bono, the defendant
ought to refund: it does not lie for money paid by the plaintiff, which is
claimed of him as payable in point of honor and honesty although it could
not have been recovered from him by any course of law." In other words,
such an action would not lie where "the defendant may retain it with a
safe conscience, though by positive law he was barred from recovering."
But it does lie for "money paid by mistake, or upon a consideration which
happens to fail, or for money got through imposition (express or implied),
or extortion, or oppression, or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiff's
situation, contrary to laws made for the protection of persons under those
circumstances. . . . In one word, the gist of this kind of action is, that
the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of
natural justice and equity to refund the money."
Lord Mansfield was in the great tradition of the Common Law. He
knew how to extend existing forms of action to new situations when
"natural justice and equity" called for it. The Common Law is tough, but
it is also elastic. This is the secret of its vitality and its capacity for
growth. But in the nineteenth century, under the influence of Bentham
and Austin, many English judges looked more and more to Parliament as
the sole maker of the law, and, while they still considered themselves
bound by the old precedents, they did not dare to create a new precedent.
In the meantime, they no longer thought in terms of "the law of God, the
law of nature, and the law of the land." For them there was no higher
law than the positive law. They no longer saw eye to eye with Thomas
More, Christopher St. Germain, Coke, Holt and Mansfield. Their men-
tality was akin to that of John Austin, to whom the idea of natural law
and natural rights was a joke, and who could write: "A sacred or inalien-
able right is truly and indeed invaluable; for seeing that it means nothing,
there is nothing with which it can be measured." 71
human reason to advance from the imperfect to the perfect." (Summa Theologica Ia liae, Q.
97, a. 1, in corp). We may add that human reason advances in two ways: first, in recognizing
new values emerging in the process of civilization; secondly, in inventing new means for
implementing the values. But in no case must it act against the fundamental principles of
the natural law.
75. 2 Burr. 1005 (K.B. 1760).
76. Austin, Province of Jurisprudence 48. For an appropriate comment on this attitude
see Le Buffe and Hayes, Jurisprudence 57-58 (Fordham University Press, 1938).
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In the present century, positivism seems to have reached its climax with
some of the English judges. In 1913, Lord Justice Hamilton, referring to
Moses v. Macferlan, said, "Whatever may have been the case 146 years
ago, we are not free . . . to administer that vague jurisprudence which is
sometimes attractively styled 'justice as between man and man.' 7 In
1923, Lord Justice Scrutton declared that "the whole history of this particu-
lar form of action has been what I may call a history of well-meaning sloppi-
ness of thought." 78
It is to be hoped that this extreme positivism is only a temporary set-
back to the Law of Nature and to the equitable spirit which is the very
soul of the Common Law. But one can have a glimpse of the modem
judicial temper in England from the thoughtful words of C. K. Allen:
"Charles Dickens did not exaggerate the desolation which the cold
hand of the old Court of Chancery could spread among those who came
to it 'for the love of God and in the way of charity.' All that is gone, and
we breathe again a healthy atmosphere; but even today it is not in a spirit
of cynicism, but of cold truth, that a modern Chancery Judge is able to
say, 'This Court is not a Court of conscience.' Our scepticism of 'con-
science' is commensurate with our veneration for prescriptive formula;
perhaps both need to find a more tolerant basis of coexistence." 71
A prophet is not without honor except in his own country. It cheers
my heart to see that the spirit of Lord Mansfield has found a congenial
home in this country. The seeds which he sowed in the field of quasi-
contracts and unjust enrichment were transplanted in this new home of
the Common Law, and have grown into a lovely tree called "Restitution,"
which may be taken as a symbol of the restoration of the Common Law
to its original vigor. The American Law Institute has produced a restate-
ment on Restitution. Professors Seavey and Scott of Harvard, in a joint
article on the subject, after enumerating seven types of situations in which
a constructive trust is imposed, come to this conclusion: "In all these
situations there is one common element, namely, that a person who holds
the title to property would be unjustly enriched at the expense of another
if he were permitted to retain it. He is therefore chargeable as construc-
tive trustee of the property." 79a The whole idea was beautifully ex-
pressed in the classic opinion of Judge Cardozo in Beatty v. Guggenheim
Exploration Co.s0 where he said, "When property has been acquired in
such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good
77. Baylis v. Bishop of London, 1 Ch. D. 127, 140 (1913).
78. Holt v. Markham, 1 K.B. 504, 513 (1923).
79. Allen, Law in the Making 396 (5th ed. Oxford, 1951).
79a. 213 L.Q. Rev. 29,45 (1938).
80. 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378 (1919).
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conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into a
trustee."
In his admirable article, "The Development of American Law and Its
Deviation from the English Law," 81 Dean Pound has remarked with a
justifiable pride, ". . the widest departure of American law from Eng-
lish law is in the constitutional law. But in this departure Americans have
been thoroughly English. We have continued and developed the doctrine
of the English common-law courts from the Middle Ages to the seven-
teenth century, where England, having in 1688 substituted parliamentary
absolutism for the royal absolutism claimed by the Stuarts, departed from
the doctrine of the common-law lawyers." 82 This is quite true. But it
must not be imagined that all modern judges in England have been alien-
ated entirely from the common-law rhythm of the law of God, the law of
Nature, and the law of the land. So far as the power of judicial review of
Parliamentary Acts is concerned, they have officially repudiated the over-
riding authority of the natural law. But where the question of the validity
of Parliamentary Act is not involved, the natural law, couched in such
terms as "natural justice and equity," "just and reasonable," or in some
other garbs, has assumed the humbler role of a supplementary source, for
filling the gaps of the positive law."3 For instance, in Cooper v. Wands-
worth Board of Works8 4 Justice Byles announced that "although there are
no positive words in a statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet
the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature."
It seems that through the power of interpreting the court still exercises a
de facto, if not de jure, control over the statutes.8, In the recent case of
Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co. v. Commissioner of Works,80 the Court of
Appeal refused to interpret in a literal manner a provision which on its
face allowed the defendants to call on the plaintiffs for an unlimited
amount of work although the sum to be paid in remuneration was fixed at
a precise and limited sum. Lord Justice Asquith said, "Only the most
compelling language would induce a court to construe the combined in-
struments as placing one party so completely at the mercy of the other." 87
81. 67 L.Q. Rev. 49 (1951).
82. Id. at 59.
83. As Messner says, "Natural law prevails in all cases where human law is deficient: It Is
complementary. By its very nature a deficiency is found in all human law." Social Ethics
209. This is true in code countries as well as in case-law countries. See Gutterldge, Compara-
tive Law 88 (2d ed. Cambridge, 1949); Paton, A Text-Book of Jurisprudence 96 (2d ed.
Oxford, 1951); Friedmann, Legal Theory 49 (2d ed. London, 1949). Goodhart, English Law
and the Moral Law (London, 1953).
84. 14 C.B.N.S. 194 (1868).
85. See Wade, The Twilight of Natural Justice?, 67 L.Q. Rev. 103 (1951).
86. 2 K.B. 632 (1949).
87. Id. at 662.
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This reminds me of my former teacher Rudolf Stammler who maintained
that no man should be subjected to the arbitrary will of another, and that
a legal demand can only be maintained in a manner that the obligor may
still remain his own neighbor."8 Now, Stammler was a Neo-Kantian, who
sincerely thought his principles of justice to be universally valid; but he
did not believe in the natural law. My present attitude toward Stammler's
philosophy of law and justice, and toward the views of all other jurists
who are idealistically but not ontologically minded, is very much the same
as that of Gilson toward Kantism, when he said, "Perhaps Kant's ethics
are but a Christian ethic cut loose from the Christian metaphysic that
justifies it, the still imposing ruins of a temple with undermined foun-
dations." 89
It is in family law that the English judges still keep more or less intact
the common-law tradition of the natural law. In a case involving the right
of a parent to the custody of the child, Lord Justice Bowen actually used
the term "natural law." He said, "Now the Court must never forget, and
will never forget, first of all, the rights of family life, which are sacred." 11
Then, speaking of the welfare of the child, he said, "It is not the benefit
to the infant as conceived by the Court, but it must be the benefit to the
infant having regard to the natural law which points out that the father
knows far better as a rule what is good for his children than a Court of
Justice. . . ." 91 In a more recent case of a similar nature, Ola Lord Jus-
tice Slesser makes two citations from St. Thomas's Summa Theologica.
One is Ia Hae Q. 10, a. 12, where St. Thomas says, "It is against natural
justice if a child before coming to the use of reason were to be taken away
from its parents' custody, or anything done to it against its parents' wish
because the child is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a
spiritual womb." The other is IH Q. 68, a. 10, where St. Thomas says that
if the children "have not yet the use of free-will, according to the natural
law they are under the care of their parents as long as they cannot look
after themselves." 92
It is not only what the Common Law does, but what it does not do, that
makes it the tender mother of the people, a mother who is wise enough
to wink at the minor faults and frailties of her children, a mother who
knows the importance of not being fussy. Lord Atkin's opinion in Bal our
88. Stanmmler, Theory of Justice 161 (Husik's transl. Macmillan, 1925).
89. Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy 342 (N.Y., 1936).
90. Agar-Ellis v. Lascelles, 24 Ch.D. 317, 337 (1883).
91. Ibid.
91a. In Re S. M. Carroll. 1 K.B. 317,354 (1931).
92. There is a good biographical sketch of Sir Henry Slesser in Hoehn, Catholic Authors
537 (Newark, 1952).
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v. Balfour,9" is a good illustration of this quality: "The common law does
not regulate the form of agreements between spouses (living in amity).
Their promises are not sealed with seals and sealing wax. The considera-
tion that really obtains for them is that natural love and affection which
counts for little in these cold Courts. . . The parties themselves are
advocates, judges, Courts, Sheriff's officer and reporter. In respect of
these promises each house is a domain into which the King's writ does not
seek to run, and to which his officers do not seek to be admitted." Al-
though natural law is not mentioned, yet I think it is in accordance with
it, because it is precisely one of the conclusions of the natural law that
human law should know its own limits. As The Book of Proverbs has it,
"He that violently bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood." 14
Even outside the family law, the law of nature is not altogether banned.
For instance, in 1768, in an appeal from a decision of Lord Mansfield, a
unanimous judgment of the Court of Exchequer said: "The law of Na-
ture is the law of God. . . . we mean to bottom this judgment upon
the law of God, the principles of reason, morality, and the common
law. . . ." 95 It is interesting to note how the Court bundles all the terms
together, as though they meant the same thing. This seems to be charac-
teristic of the mentality of the English judges.90 But their hearts are in
the right place. They are practical, and they do not care much for names.
After all, so they think,
"What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet." 97
It is in the same spirit that Justice Farwell declared in Bradford v. Fer-
rand,98 that "the conception of aequum et 'bonum and the rights flowing
therefrom which are included in the ius naturale underlie a great part of
English Common Law; although it is not usual to find 'the law of nature'
or 'natural law' referred to in so many words in English cases."
The Common Law is too deeply rooted in Christianity to be cut loose
93. 2 K.B. 571, 579 (1919).
94. Proverbs, 30:33.
95. Low v. Peers, Wilmot's Reports, 364, 371, 374 (1770).
96. Laski has described the English mind as one which "is full of real insights, can never
concentrate on any subject, never argue about it abstractly, is always driven to the use of a
concrete illustration, is rarely logical and about eight times out of ten patently in the right."
Howe, Holnes-Laski Letters 303 (Harvard, 1953). This is borne out by many of the typical
sayings one comes across in English decisions and other writings. For instance, "Ratiocination
is good, but common sense is necessary." (Evatt J. in R. v. Connare, 61 C.L.R. 620). Sir
Thomas Browne: "States are not governed by ergotisms. Many have ruled well, who could
not perhaps define a commonwealth .... When natural logic prevails not, artificial logic too
often faileth." (Christian Morals, Works of Sir Thomas Browne, Bohn's ed., 11, 111).
97. This does not make Shakespeare a nominalist, for he is not dealing with the universals.
98. 2 Ch. D. 655, 662 (1902).
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entirely from the natural-law tradition. It has a noble idea of man, of the
human person. It sets the highest value on human life and human liberty,
on the rational and social nature of man. It has not worked out an ex-
plicit scale of values; but if we look at it as a whole, we should see that it
sets a much higher value on the interests of personality than on the inter-
ests of substance. For instance, in Scaramanga v. Stamp,0 a case in
maritime law, Lord Justice Brett said that "it is contrary to public
policy that a ship should not deviate in order to save life: for a vessel to
go out of her course with that object is not a violation for the contract
that she should proceed direct to the port for which she is bound." In his
opinion, Chief Justice Cockburn said that if deviation of a ship were for
the sole purpose of saving property, it would not be thus privileged but
would entail all the usual consequences of deviation. Then he goes on to
do some bit of sound philosophizing:
"The impulsive desire to save human life when in peril is one of the most beneficial
instincts of humanity.... To all who have to trust themselves to the sea, it is of the
utmost importance that the promptings of humanity in this respect should not be
checked or interfered with by prudential consideration as to injurious consequences
which may result to a ship or cargo from the needed aid .... Goods' owners must be
taken... as acquiescing in the universal practice of the maritime world prompted as
it is by the inherent instinct of human nature and founded on the common interest of
all who are exposed to the perils of the sea." 100
Here we hear the very voice of the Common Law. It is a judgment just
and reasonable and ordained to the common good. It is consonant with
the scholastic philosophy of law.
"Laws," said St. Thomas, "are laid down for human acts dealing with
singular and contingent matters which have infinite variations. To make
a rule fit every case is impossible." 101 This has been borne out by the
juridical experience of all countries, whether they depend mainly on legis-
lation or on case law. As Allen has pointed out, "even at this day when so
many permutations and combinations have been considered and recorded,
cases 'of first impression' are by no means uncommon in the courts. In
such cases, the judge would fail in his duty to do justice, if he were to dis-
miss the action on the ground that the law is silent and that the remedy
lies with the legislature. Such an attitude is not in line with the common-
law tradition. But to what must the judges turn for guidance?" Allen's
answer is "To those principles of reason, morality, and social utility which
are the fountain-head not only of English law but of all law. The judge
is not embarrassed by the absence of 'authority' in clear cases of this
99. 5 CP.D). 298 (1880). See an interesting article by Richard O'Sullivan on A Scale of
Values in the Common Law, 1 Mod. L. Rev. 27 (1938).
100. Id. at 304.
101. Gilby, St. Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Texts 364 (Oxford, 1951).
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kind, for no authority is needed for the affirmation of the very essence of
law." 102 From the modern cases that he cites to substantiate this state-
ment, one may safely conclude that, although the law of nature is deprived
of its metaphysical or ontological basis in England, so that it is no longer
held to have any power of invalidating a positive law as in the days of
Bracton and of Coke, yet it still holds the residuary power of complement-
ing it. Driven out from the front door, it has returned by the back door.
Even in this age of positivism, there can be no way of uprooting the law
of Nature so long as man remains man. Practically in all modern codes,
natural law is admitted as one of the sources of the law. I need only give
one sample:
"In all civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound to proceed
and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural
law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent." 103
HI
Now we shall consider how the Common Law in its new home has
treated the Natural Law. It does not take deep study to discover that the
Natural Law has received a much warmer reception in America than in
any other country in the world. The truth is that the vitality of the
natural-law tradition depends ultimately upon religion, and no one could
ever take religion more seriously and earnestly than the Puritans and their
compatriots who founded this Nation. To them "the laws of nature and
of nature's God" were no fancy, nor even mere ideals; they were abso-
lutely real, infinitely more real than any human laws. Nor were they in-
dulging in rhetoric when they declared, "We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness." They meant exactly what they said. They
were generous, sincere, freedom-loving and God-fearing people. They
saw these truths so clearly and felt so deeply about them that they were
more than willing to stake their lives upon them. Even in the late 1830s,
Alexis de Tocqueville could truthfully testify:
"In the United States the sovereign authority is religious, and consequently hypoc-
risy must be common; but there is no country in the whole world in which the Christian
religion retains a greater influence over the souls of men than in America; and there
can be no greater proof of its utility, and of its conformity to human nature, than that
its influence is most powerfully felt over the most enlightened and free nation of the
earth." 104
The formative days of American jurisprudence are reminiscent of the
102. Allen, Op. cit. supra note 79 at 277.
103. Dart's, La. Civil Code Art. 21.
104. De Toqueville, Democracy in America 332 (1848).
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great days of the Magna Carta, and also of the later struggles of Coke for
the supremacy of the Law of Nature over man-made laws. Coke's efforts
had been frustrated in England, but his influence on American lawyers of
the eighteenth century was immense. Before the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, all that 'the colonists wanted was to be the inheritors of the
Common Law, the Common Law as Coke and the older jurists understood
it. In his pamphlet on The Right of the Inhabitants of Maryland to the
Benefit of the English Laws, published in the 1760s, Daniel Dulaney,
Attorney-General of Maryland, argued for the right of the Americans to
the natural and legal liberties, privileges, and rights of Englishmen in the
realm. But what is of special bearing on our theme is the way Dulaney
conceived of the Common Law. According to him, the Common Law
"takes in the Law of Nature, the Law of Reason, and the revealed Law
of God." "I These are equally binding, at all times, in all places, and to
all persons. Besides these universal principles, the Common Law also
embodies such usages and customs as have been experimentally found to
suit the order and engagements of society, and to contain nothing incon-
sistent with honesty, decency, and good manners."' These, he said, have
obtained the force of law by consent and long use. This conception of the
Common Law is in the grand tradition of Bracton and Coke.
The religious foundations of law are brought out even more dearly and
forcibly in the writings of the famous Boston lawyer, James Otis. I want
to quote a passage which seems to me to be the cornerstone of the ortho-
dox American philosophy of natural law.
"To say the parliament is absolute and arbitrary, is a contradiction. The parliament
cannot make 2 and 2, 5: Omnipotency cannot do it. The supreme power in a state, is
jus dicere only:-jus dare, strictly speaking, belongs alone to God. Parliaments are in
all cases to declare what is for the good of the whole; but it is not the declaration of
parliament that makes it so: There must be in every instance, a higher authority, viz.
GOD. Should an act of parliament be against any of His natural laws, which are
immutably true, their declaration would be contrary to eternal truth, equity and justice,
and consequently void: and so it would be adjudged by the parliament itself, when
convinced of their mistake." 107
When you hear people talk with such clear vision and true conviction,
you feel that the world is beginning again. Like Adam and Eve, they were
so close to God. So was Jefferson who said that "the God who gave us
life gave us liberty at the same time." 08 So was John Adams when he
wrote: "I would ask, by what law the parliament has authority over
America? By the law of God, in the Old and New Testament, it has none;
105. See Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law 59 (Harvard, 1931).
105. Ibid.
107. Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved 47 (1764).
108. 1 Writings 447 (Ford. ed.).
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* . . by the common law of England, it has none. . ,, 109 So was Alex-
ander Hamilton, who wrote: "The sacred rights of mankind are not to be
rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written,
as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of
Divinity Itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power." 110
It must be pointed out that, although these great men drew their inspira-
tion mainly from the Bible and the Common Law, they also absorbed to
a degree some rationalistic ideas from such authors as John Locke, Gro-
tius, Pufendorf, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Burlamaqui. They were not
too well acquainted with the scholastic tradition. Due, no doubt, to their
historical situation, they were inclined to think more of the natural liber-
ties and rights of man than of the Natural Law and natural duties. They
talked more about the individual rights than about the common good.
Perhaps, in their time, the very establishment and maintenance of indi-
vidual freedom constituted the chief part of the common good. As Black-
stone had put it, "the public good is in nothing more essentially interested
than in the protection of every individual's private rights." "I
Nothing shows the soundness of the Founding Fathers more clearly
than in their use of the phrase "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."
In spite of the influence of John Locke on them, they did not adopt the
Lockean rhythm of "lives, liberties and estates." As Bishop Sheen has
pointed out in his Philosophy of Religion, it was Jefferson who caused the
words "pursuit of happiness" to be substituted for the word "property"
emphasized by Samuel Adams, who was a follower of Locke. Property
may be one element of happiness, but it is not all.
When some of the later judges came to identify "happiness" with
"property," they actually departed from the spirit of an overwhelming
majority of the early Americans. Justice Brewer was right in maintaining
that the Constitution should be read in the light of the Declaration of
Independence, 112 but I doubt very much whether his reading of the Decla-
ration was right, when he spoke of the inalienable rights in terms of "the
sacredness of life, of liberty, and of property." l8
Property is a natural right, but there is a hierarchy of values even
among natural rights. Important as it is, it does not belong to the same
109. See Wright, op. cit. supra note 105, at 88.
110. Id. at 90-91.
111. Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law 53 (Marshall-Jones, 1921).
112. Justice Brewer rightly asserted that the Declaration "is the thought and the spirit,
and it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of
Independence." Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160 (1897).
113. See Charles Grove Haine's criticism of Brewer's extreme individualism in his article
The History of the Due Process of Law After the Civil War, included in 1 Selected Essays on
Constitutional Law 268, 295-6 (Foundation Press, 1938).
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level as life and liberty. Life and liberty are ends in themselves, while
property is only an instrumental value.114 I think many of the erroneous
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of United States in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the present
century can be traced to an over-emphasis on the rights of property at the
expense of the personal rights of men and the legitimate demands of the
common good. Many of such decisions have been overruled by the same
Court.
Nothing is so fascinating as to follow the fortunes of the natural-law
philosophy in this country. Its chief glory lies in its confirmation of the
idea that there is a Higher Law than positive laws. In its early days, the
American philosophy of the Natural Law did not separate itself from
religion, and became the rock on which a true democracy was built. The
genuine tradition of the Natural Law is essentially theistic and demo-
cratic.115 As Cardinal Spellman has said, "The role of religion in a de-
mocracy is crystal clear from a consideration of the basic meaning of
Democracy. The prime function of Democracy, which distinguishes it
from and elevates it above every other form of government, is its regard
and concern for the dignity and the rights of the individual, inalienable
rights derived from the natural law. . . . This great natural law, ante-
cedent to all human enactment and contrivance, is the only foundation on
which the structure of Democracy can rest secure. For not by mutual
consent or by covenant, not by warrant or state grant are these rights
established. They are the gifts of God and the bestowal of God." 118 So
long as we remember this, there is no danger of abusing the concept of
Natural Law for justifying a materialistic individualism; because we
know that God who gave us liberty gave us also reason and a supernatural
destiny. In other words, we receive our natural rights together with our
natural duties, such as the love of God and of our neighbor." 7
But the fact is that many judges of the last century imbibed Natural
Law through the speculative and rationalistic philosophers of the eight-
eenth century who treated the natural law as if it were geometry. If the
English judges of the last century were too timid to assert the supremacy
114. According to St. Thomas, private property is a natural right, but, unlike the natural
rights of life, liberty and family integrity, which are derived from the very nature of things,
ownership is justified by "a judgment of consequences," and requires adjustment by the
human reason. 'Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an
addition thereto devised by human reason." Summa Theologica Ha Ilae, Q. 66, A.2, ad 1.
115. Schmidt, An Approach to the Natural Law, 19 Ford. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1950).
116. Address of His Eminence, Francis Cardinal Spellman, at the Military Chaplains'
Association Convention Dinner, July 24, 1952 (in mimeograph).
117. Christ Himself has taught us that upon these two duties hang all the laws. Matt.,
22:34-39; Mlark, 12:28-34.
1954]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
and absoluteness of even the primary precepts of the natural law, the
American judges were too bold in exalting matters of opinion to the pedes-
tal of the Natural Law and even in erecting their prejudices into immu-
table precepts. Thus, they fell into a barren conceptualism and a mechan-
ical jurisprudence.
None of the judges of the last century was, to my knowledge, acquainted
with the Thomistic distinction between speculative reason and practical
reason. According to St. Thomas, physical sciences belong to speculative
reason, while law belongs to practical reason. Speculative reason deals
with necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, and there-
fore there is necessity alike in its universal principles and in its particular
conclusions. Practical reason, on the other hand, deals with contingent
matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently,
although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend
to matters of detail, the less necessity we find.' 18 Human laws cannot, in
the nature of things, have the unerring quality of scientifically demon-
strated conclusions. Not every rule need possess final infallibility and
certainty; as much as is possible in its class is enough. 1 " For instance,
it is a precept of natural law that we should do justice, and that justice
consists in giving each one his due. This is an immutable and necessary
principle. But, as St. Thomas says, "The obligation of observing justice
is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just,
according to human or Divine institution, must needs be different, accord-
ing to the different states of mankind." 120 It must also be remembered
that law is essentially an ordinance of reason directed to the common
good. It is a teleological, not a mechanical science. It must be rational,
but not rationalistic.' 2 '
The Rationalists, being cut loose from the sound tradition of Scholasti-
cism, vied with each other in weaving out from their own bellies complete
systems of natural law from the general principles to the minutest details.
They relied too much on the human reason. Paradoxical as it may seem,
it was the juridical rationalism of the eighteenth century that gave birth
to the juridical positivism of the nineteenth. The former believed in the
ability of human reason to work out a complete code. The legislators in
some European countries took the hint, and attempted to carry the teach-
118. Summa Theologica Ia, IIae, Q. 94, A.4.
119. Id. at Q. 91, A.3 ad 3.
120. Id. at Q. 104, A-3 ad 1.
121. The best characterization of the rationalistic attitude is found in the words of Leo
XIII: "The fundamental doctrine of Rationalism is the supremacy of the human reason,
which, refusing due submission to the divine and eternal reason, proclaims its own independ-
ence, and constitutes itself the supreme principle and source and judge of truth." The Great
Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo XIII 145 (Benziger, 1903).
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ing into practice. They were convinced that "a body of enacted rules
might be made so complete and so perfect that the judge would have only
to select the one made in advance for the case in hand. .. . 122 The
code of Frederick the Great was drawn up on this theory. The intention
was to provide for all contingencies with such careful minuteness that no
possible doubt could arise in the future. As Schuster says:
"This stereotyping of the law was in accordance with the doctrine of the law of
nature according to which a perfect system might be imagined, for which no changes
would ever become necessary, and which could therefore be laid down once for all, so
as to be available for any possible combination of circumstances." 1 2 3
In America, this rationalistic conception exercised a deep influence.
Although there was no Code, the judges conceived of the Common Law as
"a brooding omnipresence in the sky," rather than as a tree that has to
grow from season to season. Every case, however novel and complicated,
was, in theory, covered by the Common Law, and therefore there could
only be one logical decision to each case. 124 It was against this kind of
mentality that Justice Holmes revolted. He said, "I once heard a very
eminent judge say that he never let a decision go until he was absolutely
sure that it was right. So judicial dissent often is blamed, as if it meant
simply that one side or the other were not doing their sums right, and if
they would take more trouble, agreement inevitably would come ....
But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man.
Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and impor-
tance of competing legislative grounds . 1.2 In this he was right,
because he was speaking of the decision of concrete cases, which depend
upon human determinations of the natural law, and these, according to St.
Thomas, can seldom, if ever, claim absolute certainty. But when Holmes
made a wholesale denial of the Natural Law, he fell into Charybdis in
shunning Scylla. It is a pity that he never studied St. Thomas. If he had,
he probably would not have thrown out the baby with the bath water.
But I must point out an ironic situation in modern American juris-
prudence. As one studies the cases on social legislation, one will find that
as a general rule the judges who used the name of natural law have ren-
122. Pound, op. cit. supra note 111, at 178.
123. Ibid.
124. The historical school in England and America regarded the Common Law as a
self-sufficient organism. For them the early rudimentary origins of the law "contain, potenti-
ally, all the forms in which the law has subsequently exhibited itself." This is the idea of Sir
Henry Maine. See Ancient Law, Chapter 1 (1930). In America, James C. Carter and many
judges were influenced by this idea. To them, judges never make law but find it. They
declare what is already there, at least, potentially. For a fair estimate of Carter see Aronson,
The Juridical Evolutionism of James C. Carter, 10 U. of Toronto L.J. 1 (1953).
125. Holmes, Collected Legal Papers 180-181 (1920).
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dered wrong decisions, while the judges who were sceptical of the natural
law have reached results which coincide with conclusions of the two great
Encyclicals: Rerum Novarum and Quadragessimo Anno.120 What could
be the reason of this strange phenomenon? The reason seems manifold.
In the first place, the economic doctrine of laissez-faire while it might have
served the purpose and needs of a particular age and therefore was his-
torically justifiable to a certain extent, can never be regarded as an immu-
table precept of the Natural Law. It certainly helped to develop the
marvelous industrial civilization of America, but in the meantime indus-
trial civilization has brought with it new problems unknown to the days
of handicrafts. New situations require new measures of law to regulate
them: but most of the judges knew only the old law and old legal theories,
which they had identified with the Natural Law. In the second place, their
conception of justice was inadequate. They knew only one form of justice,
namely, commutative justice: they did not seem to know distributive
justice. 27 Usually, only commutative justice is involved in the decision
of cases. It is not for the judge to go out of his way to administer dis-
tributive justice, which is principally the job of the legislator. But the
fault of the conservative judges in those days of transition lay in their
unwarranted and arbitrary interference with the legislators simply be-
cause that form of justice was new to them.
Let us take one instance. In Ives v. South Buffalo R. R., 28 the Court
invalidated the New York Workmen's Compensation Act of 1910. Judge
Werner said, "One of the inalienable rights of every citizen is to hold and
enjoy his property until it is taken from him by due process of law. When
our Constitutions were adopted it was the law of the land that no man
who was without fault or negligence could be held liable in damages for
injuries sustained by another." Judge Cullen added, "It is the physical
law of nature, not of government, that imposes upon one meeting with an
injury, the suffering occasioned thereby. Human law cannot change that.
All it can do is to require pecuniary indemnity to the party injured, and
I know of no principle on which one can be compelled to indemnify an-
other for loss unless it is based upon contractual obligation or fault."
126. Some of the Catholic judges do not seem to have so much as peeped into these
immortal documents, which embody the social teachings of the Church. On the other hand,
the sociologically-minded judges have arrived at practically identical conclusions independ-
ently, thinking that they are making new contributions. But only a true Christian philosophy
of law can steer safely between the Scylla of individualism and the Charybdis of socialism. On
this point, read Gilby, Between Community and Society (Longman's, 19S3); O'Connor, The
Supreme Court and Labor (Washington, 1932); Masse, S.J., Economic Liberalism and Free
Enterprise (America Press, 1944).
127. See Ryan, Distributive Justice (Macmillan, 1927).
128. 201 N.Y. 271,293,318,94N.E.431,439,449 (1911).
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Justice Pitney takes a much sounder view in a similar case."' He views
industry as a cooperative enterprise between employer and employee.
"Employer and employee, by mutual consent, engage in a common operation in-
tended to be advantageous to both; the employee is to contribute his personal services,
and for these is to receive wages, and ordinarily, nothing more; the employer is to furnish
plant, facilities, organization, capital, credit, is to control and manage the operation,
paying the wages and other expenses, disposing of the product at such prices as he can
obtain, taking all the profits if any there be, and, of necessity, bearing the entire losses.
In the nature of things, there is more or less of a probability that the employee may lose
his life through some accidental injury arising out of the employment, leaving his
widow or children deprived of their natural support .... This is a loss arising out of
the business, and, however it may be charged up, is an expense of the operation, as
truly as the cost of repairing broken machinery or any other expense that ordinarily
is paid by the employer. . . . It is plain that, on grounds of natural justice, it is not
unreasonable for the state . . . to require him to contribute a reasonable amount, and
according to a reasonable and definite scale, by way of compensation for the loss of
earning power incurred in the common enterprise, irrespective of the question of negli-
gence, instead of leaving the entire loss to rest where it may chance to fall, that is, upon
the injured employee or his dependents."
Finally, he points out that liability without fault is not a novelty in the
Common Law. That there should be no liability without fault is a sound
general rule. But as St. Thomas says, Laws are laid down for human acts
dealing with singular and contingent matters which can have infinite vari-
ations. To make a rule to fit every case is impossible. 130 Furthermore, as
Justice Brandeis says, some laws attempt to enforce individual justice,
while other laws attempt to do social justice.1 31 They have different fields
of application.
Perhaps, the most important and difficult problem of jurisprudence is
how to strike the golden mean between individual interests and social
interests, how to transcend both individualism and collectivism. It is most
significant that Dean Pound who was among the first to protest against
the abuses of the dogma of liberty of contract, 132 should have recently
uttered a warning against what Josserand calls "contractual dirigismY 133
"May we not have faith that [the common-law] tradition will have con-
tinued strength to resist the effects of economic unification of the world
and losing sight of the individual in the general bigness of things, and the
tendency of the service State to become omnicompetent and totalitarian,
and so to secure to the English-speaking world the liberty which it has
129. New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 203 (1917).
130. Summa Theologica ha, Hae, Q. 120, A.1 in corp. as trans. by Gilby, Thomas
Aquinas Phiosophical Texts 364 (London, 1952).
131. New York Central R.R. v. Winfield, 244 US. 147 (1917).
132. Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 Yale IJ. 454 (1909).
133. Pound, The Development of American Law and its Deviation from English Law, 67
L.Q. Rev. 60 (1951).
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always claimed as its birthright." 184 But in order to keep the Common-
Law tradition, we have, as a first step, to pass through a spiritual renais-
sance and go back to the great tradition of Coke, of St. Thomas More, and
of Bracton. Finally, we must have a clear grasp of the Scholastic idea of
the common good, which lay at the basis of the Common Law from its
very beginning.
The common good does not mean merely the collective good of the
State.'35 It includes that, but above all it embraces all the personal goods
common to men as men. In order to minister to these goods, the law must
recognize and protect the fundamental rights of the person, which Pius
XII has enumerated as follows:
". .. the right to maintain and develop physical, intellectual, moral life, and in
particular the right to a religious training and education; the right to worship God,
both in private and public, including the right to engage in religious works of charity;
the right, in principle, to marriage and to the attainment of the purpose of marriage,
the right to wedded society and home life; the right to work as an indispensable means
for the maintenance of family life; the right to the free choice of a state of life, and
therefore of the priestly and religious state; the right to the use of material goods, subject
to its duties and social limitations." 136
It will be seen that this list of fundamental rights of man is comprehen-
sive enough to cover the three main heads of inalienable rights-life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
It is worthy of note that in connection with "the right to the use of
material goods," the Holy Father hastens to add the words "subject to its
duties and social limitations." Material goods have never been regarded
by the Church or by any true Christian as ends in themselves, but only
a means to the higher ends. It is with regard to material goods that St.
Thomas said that "The common good takes precedence over the private
good, if it be of the same genus; but it may be that the private good is
better generically." "I On the other hand, strictly personal rights, such
as the right to worship God, should never be interfered with by the State
in the name of the common good, for the simple reason that it belongs to
a higher order than the temporal interests with which the State has to do.
The Holy Father has also said, "The original and essential purpose of
social life is to preserve, develop, and perfect the human person." 138
134. Id. at 66. See also Constable, What Does Natural Law jurisprudence Offer? 4
Catholic U.L. Rev. 1 (1954).
135. See Maritain, The Person and the Common Good (Scribners, 1947).
136. The Rights of Man, Christmas Broadcast, 1942, transl. by Canon G. D. Smith,
included in Selected Letters and Addresses of Pius XII 290 (Catholic Truth Society, London,
1949).
137. Summa Theologica Ha, flae, Q. 152, A.4 ad 3.
138. Op. cit. supra note 136, at 281.
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Religion and ethics contribute directly to the realization of this purpose.
Human law works toward this end in a less direct way; but, in the words
of the Holy Father, it can and should effectively contribute toward "the
permanent realization of the common good" by providing for ". . . those
external conditions which are needful to citizens as a whole for the devel-
opment of their qualities and the fulfilment of their duties in every sphere
of life, material, intellectual, and religious." 1
Law is made for man, not man for law. So, ultimately the end of man is
the end of law. Now what is the end of man? As St. Thomas views it, it
is threefold: the practice of virtues, friendship between man and man, and
the enjoyment of God. "The end of human life and society is God." 140
The contribution of law toward this end is twofold. Positively, it is most
effective in the procuring of those external conditions as are conducive to
the end. Negatively, it must leave man free to pursue the threefold end,
which constitutes his proper happiness.
Bishop John J. Wright describes the common good as "the mutual bond
of all who love the good, the true and the beautiful; who seek good things,
not evil; who seek the private good of persons and the collective good of
the State, but the good of both in and under and through the Supreme
Good which is God." 141 This holds good both for ethics and for juris-
prudence. Justice Roger J. Kiley, speaking from the point of view of
human law, has said, "Temporal happiness in a well governed community
is not man's final end. Human Law does not presume to take man to his
final end. It aims at a subordinate end, a peaceful and orderly community
in which men by living virtuously may be happy and thus strive for perfect
happiness with God in a life hereafter." 142
All human laws must be ordained to the love of God and love of our
neighbor. Judging by this standard, I honestly do not find much to criti-
cize in the present conditions of the American Common Law. Even the
advent of the "service State" does not seem to interfere with our freedom
arbitrarily, provided that both the government and the people remember
that the servant must never turn into a master. The greatest problem in
the America of today is not that we are not free enough, but how to fill
that freedom with spiritual and cultural values and thus turn it into the
liberty of the children of God. Man is made in the image of God, and we
lawyers have a special way of resembling Him. To resemble the Father,
we should cultivate Justice; to resemble the Son, we should follow the
139. Id. at 282.
140. Summa Theologica Ia, Hae, Q. 100, A. 6, in corp.
141. Address to St. Thomas Aore Society, Harvard Law School, Nov. 16, 1952. (In
mimeograph).
142. "'Human Law," an appendix to Summa Theologica 3266 (Amer. ed. Benziger 1948).
1954]
48 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
Law of Nature; and to resemble the Holy Ghost, we should practise
Equity.1 4 3
143. In a paper on "Law and the Spirit," Richard Kehoe, O.P., has said, "What should
urge a Catholic, then, to urge the doctrine of Natural Law should not be any notion that on
its basis an order of life can be founded in which believers and non-believers can live happily
together, secluded from Spiritual and Supernatural issues, but the conception of Nature,
with all its laws, as being the sphere within which the Supernatural must work, as providing
the Body which the Spirit must inform." O'Sullivan, Under God and the Law 94-95 (New-
man Press, 1949). Any Christian who talks about the Natural Law apart from Christianity
is in danger of falling into the pit of rationalism. Man's natural reason suffices to know the
Natural Law, but it takes grace to make it effective in the human world. As the great
historian Lord Acton has observed, "It was left for Christianity . . . to animate the old
truths .... The only thing Socrates could do in the way of a protest-against tyranny was
to die for his convictions. The Stoics could only advise the wise man to hold aloof from
politics and keep faith with the unwritten law in his heart. But when Christ said, 'Render
unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's,' he gave to
the State a legitimacy it had never before enjoyed, and set bounds to it that it bad never yet
acknowledged. And He not only delivered the precept but also forged the instrument to
execute it. To limit the power of the State ceased to be the hope of patient, ineffectual
philosophers and became the perpetual charge of a universal Church." Quoted in Fremantle,
Christian Conversation: Catholic Thought for Every Day in the Year (Stephen Daye Press,
1953).
